Legal Definition of Cognitive Faculties
The modern conception of the logical form – as found, for example, in the symbolic and mathematical logic of Gottlob Frege`s Begriffsschrift (Frege 1972), Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead`s Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell 1962) and Ludwig Wittgenstein`s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1922) – owes much to Kant`s conception of the logical form, if not so much to his particular conception of logic. which, from today`s perspective, may seem “terribly narrow-minded and mathematically trivial,” as Allen Hazen has dryly put it (Hazen 1999). On the other hand, it is clearly true that Kant`s conception of mathematical form, found in his theory of pure or formal intuition, significantly influenced Wittgenstein`s conception of the logical form in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1922, Props 2.013, 5.552, 5.61 and 6.13). There is an ongoing scientific debate as to whether Kant`s conception of mathematical form is a direct expression of the narrow-mindedness of his logical theory, or rather a direct expression of the striking originality of his philosophy of mathematics (Parsons 1983, Friedman 1992, Shabel 2003, Hanna 2006b, chap. 6, Shabel 2006). But more importantly, Kant`s profound idea that logic and logical form can only exist in the context of the judgmental activities and judgmental abilities of rational human animals has greatly influenced some influential philosophers of logic, linguists, philosophers of language, and cognitive scientists, from Boole and Wilhelm von Humboldt (Von Humboldt 1988) to Frege. the last Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky (Wittgenstein 1953, paras. 241-242, Chomsky 1975, Bell 1979, Bell 1987). One of the main goals of cognitive science is to achieve an integrated theory of cognition. This requires integrative mechanisms that explain how information processing, which takes place simultaneously in spatially separated (sub)cortical areas of the brain, is coordinated and linked to coherent perceptual and symbolic representations. One approach is to solve this “attachment problem”[70][71][72] (i.e.
the problem of the dynamic representation of the conjunctions of information elements, from the most basic perceptual representations (“trait binding”) to the most complex cognitive representations, such as symbol structures (“variable binding”)), by means of integrative synchronization mechanisms. In other words, one of the coordination mechanisms appears to be the temporal synchronization (phase) of neuronal activity based on dynamic processes of self-organization in neural networks, described by the synchronous linkage (BBS) hypothesis of neurophysiology. [73] [74] [75] [76] Connectionist cognitive neuroarchitectures have been developed that use integrative synchronization mechanisms to solve this attachment problem in perceptual cognition and language cognition. [77] [78] [79] In perceptual cognition, it is the problem of how the elementary properties of the object and object relations, such as the color or shape of the object, can be dynamically connected to each other or integrated into a representation of that perceptual object by means of a synchronization mechanism (“feature binding”, “feature linking”). In language cognition, it is the problem of how semantic concepts and syntactic roles can be dynamically connected or integrated into complex cognitive representations such as systematic and compositional symbol structures and sentences by means of a synchronization mechanism (“variable binding”) (see also “Symbolism vs. connectionism debate” in connectionism). Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary field with contributions from various fields, including psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, philosophy of mind, computer science, anthropology, and biology. Cognitive scientists work collectively in hopes of understanding the mind and its interactions with the surrounding world in the same way as other sciences. The field considers itself compatible with the natural sciences and uses the scientific method as well as simulation or modeling, often comparing model results with aspects of human cognition. Similar to the field of psychology, there are doubts about the existence of a unified science of cognition, which has led some researchers to favor “cognitive science” in the plural.
[23] [24] Cognitive science began in the 1950s as an intellectual movement called the cognitive revolution. The history of cognitive science dates back to ancient Greek philosophical texts (see Plato`s Meno and Aristotle`s De Anima); Modernist philosophers such as Descartes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Benedict of Spinoza, Nicolas Malebranche, Peter Cabanis, Leibniz, and John Locke rejected scholasticism, even though they had mostly never read Aristotle, and they worked with a completely different set of basic tools and concepts than cognitive scientists. Needless to say, however, if one believes that the Kantian definition of analytics is truth by virtue of confinement, and also that the Kantian definition of synthetics is truth by virtue of non-confinement, as well as a Kantian conceptualist view of the nature of judgment, then Kant`s conception of analytical and synthetic judgments will be proportionately different (Anderson 2004, Anderson 2005, Anderson 2009, Anderson 2015). For Kant, the concept of “cognitive content” has two distinctly different meanings: (i) objective and representative intention or content (semantic content); and (ii) sensory matter or matter, which is subjective and non-representative, reflecting only the mind`s immediate conscious response to external impressions or inputs that trigger sensitivity operations (phenomenal qualitative content) (A19-20/B34, A320/B376). Certainly, for Kant as for empiricists, all knowledge begins with ” (with . Begin) the raw data of sensory impressions. But in a decisive departure from empiricism and towards what might be called an attenuated rationalism, Kant also argues that not all knowledge is “born” (stems from.. de) sensory impressions: for him, a significant and unique contribution to both the form and content of objective representation of cognition comes from innate spontaneous cognitive abilities (B1).
